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Abstract
Social learning can be adaptive, but little
is known about the underlying mechanisms.
Many researchers have focused on imitation
but this may have led to simpler mechanisms
being underestimated. We demonstrate in
simulation that imitative learning is not al-
ways the best strategy for a group-living an-
imal, and that the e®ectiveness of any such
strategy will depend on details of the en-
vironment and the animal's lifestyle. We
show that observations of behavioural conver-
gence or \traditions" might suggest e®ective
social learning, but are meaningless considered
alone.
G
ETTING by in the world is all about
doing the right thing at the right
time: eat the fallen fruit, avoid the poi-
sonous mushroom, run from the approach-
ing predator. But how does an animal pro-
duce the best response, or at least a satis-
factory response, in each of the many pos-
sible situations it may face? We can dis-
tinguish two main sources of information
used in this constant action-selection task.
First, there is genetically inherited informa-
tion, such as instinctive drives or tenden-
cies. You run from the approaching preda-
tor because you were born with a brain that
was wired up that way. Second, there is
information based on experience, i.e., the
results of learning. You avoid the mush-
room because you've learned that it will
make you sick.
Learning sometimes involves an individ-
ual ¯nding out through trial and error
about what to do in di®erent situations.
However, in a social species, there is often
valuable information to be gleaned from the
behaviour of others: for example, why risk
poisoning by sampling potential foodstu®s
at random when you could simply eat the
same things your conspeci¯cs are eating?
In this paper we are concerned with this
idea of social learning, and will compare
the performance of di®erent social learning
mechanisms in a simulated environment.
Researchers in animal behaviour are in-
creasingly in agreement that social learning
is an important element in the overall adap-
tive strategy of many species (see Heyes &
Galef, 1996, for a general review, or Box
& Gibson, 1999, for case studies on so-
cial learning in mammals). From lion cubs
learning about how to bring down prey,
to rats learning through smell about which
foods are safe to eat, it is clear that animals
use the behaviour of their more experienced
peers as a source of valuable information.
However, in reviewing the literature on so-
cial learning, we often ¯nd that although
investigators believe social learning to be
occurring in a particular species, there is
very little known about the speci¯c mecha-
nisms that underlie it. For example, in Box
and Gibson's edited collection, many con-
tributors discuss the ecology of their chosenspecies in order to illustrate the likely roles
that social learning may play, but can only
speculate about exactly how the animals in
question actually learn through the obser-
vation of another's behaviour.
Another curious fact about the social
learning literature is the emphasis on im-
itation as a potential mechanism. Imita-
tion | or \imitative learning" (Tomasello,
1996, p. 324) | is a cognitively complex
process that requires not only perceiving
and reproducing the bodily movements of
another, but understanding the changes in
the environment caused by the other's be-
haviour, and ¯nally being able to grasp the
\intentional relations" between these, i.e.,
knowing how and why the behaviour is sup-
posed to bring about the goal. This em-
phasis on imitation is particularly strong
in the case of work on primates (see, e.g.,
Whiten, 1998). A focus on imitation is not
surprising: it is likely to be implicated in
the explosive cultural evolution of our own
species, and so we have a natural curiosity
about the extent to which other animals in
general, and our primate cousins in partic-
ular, might share this ability. Nevertheless,
looking at imitation alone may blind us to
the potential of much simpler mechanisms
through which the behaviour of one animal
can in°uence the learning experience of an-
other.
Although we often do not understand
how social learning occurs, there is a body
of work on why it might occur, i.e., on the
conditions under which it would o®er a se-
lective advantage. Models of cultural trans-
mission (Boyd & Richerson, 1985) and re-
lated phenomena such as \highly horizontal
transmission" (Laland, Richerson, & Boyd,
1996) help to delineate the conditions un-
der which it will be advantageous for in-
dividuals to learn from others rather than
¯nding things out for themselves. However,
these models tend to result in rather gen-
eral conclusions. For example, Laland et al.
(1996) summarize work on cultural trans-
mission by relating it to rates of change in
the environment: in static environments,
genetic transmission of behaviour patterns
can do the job, and in rapidly changing
environments, only individual learning can
keep up, whereas at intermediate rates of
change, social learning will o®er an advan-
tage. Results like these are useful, but to
get a complete picture of social learning we
also need to understand the mechanisms in-
volved.
Individual-based simulations, as used in
arti¯cial life research, represent an excel-
lent way of instantiating a hypothesized so-
cial learning mechanism and thereby test-
ing its plausibility. ALife models of this
type have certainly been explored in related
domains such as communication, domi-
nance and territorial behaviour, and °ock-
ing or schooling. There are also a signif-
icant number of robotics researchers who
share the primatologists' interest in imi-
tation and see it as a way of improving
human{robot or robot{robot communica-
tion (for a review of this work see Schaal,
1999).
However, as yet relatively few ALife
models have looked at social learning us-
ing mechanisms simpler than imitation.
One example is the work of Toquenaga,
Kajitani, and Hoshino (1995) who con-
structed a simulation of foraging and nest-
ing behaviour in egrets. They used their
model to demonstrate that learning socially
about the location of food, through sim-
ply approaching other birds, is more likely
to evolve when food resources are patchy
rather than evenly distributed. Toquenaga
et al. suggest that °ock foraging and colo-
nial roosting may be based on this princi-
ple. In the same vein, Noble, Todd, and
Tuci (2001) considered the selective pres-
sures a®ecting social learning about foodin Norway rats. They found that a surpris-
ingly simple strategy, which involved ignor-
ing signs of food poisoning in others, was
favoured as long as toxins were very dan-
gerous. This ¯nding was used to explain
apparently paradoxical aspects of rat be-
haviour.
Noble and Todd (in press) have previ-
ously argued that a focus on imitation has
led to the power of simpler social learning
processes being underestimated; they de-
scribe a number of candidate simple mech-
anisms, and encourage the use of simula-
tion models as a way of demonstrating the
potential of such mechanisms. The purpose
of the current paper is to follow up on this
work by instantiating some of the mecha-
nisms discussed by Noble and Todd, in a
simple environment that re°ects the learn-
ing challenges faced by a hypothetical ani-
mal. The aim is to show that simple mecha-
nisms can perform well under the right en-
vironmental circumstances, and hopefully
to demonstrate that imitative learning has
received a disproportionate amount of at-
tention. We must stress that even though
our simulated agents are inspired by sev-
eral di®erent primates, our goal is not to
model learning in any particular species,
but to set up a speci¯c, controlled environ-
ment in which the performance of di®erent
social learning strategies can be compared.
In looking at the data that is output
by our simulation, we want to adopt the
perspective of an ethologist who is observ-
ing behaviour in the ¯eld and trying to
come up with conclusions about the un-
derlying mechanisms. Noble and Todd (in
press) make the point, following Braiten-
berg (1984), that human observers of ani-
mal and robot behaviour have a propensity
to invoke mechanisms that are more com-
plex than those strictly needed to explain
that behaviour. For example, the presence
of a distinctive behaviour pattern across all
members of a group could be taken as evi-
dence for sophisticated social learning, but
might result simply from similar individ-
ual learning experiences. We hope to show
that much of the data a ¯eld observer might
plausibly collect about a population could
easily lead them astray in theorizing about
what the animals were really doing.
The simulation
The environment consists of a 10 £ 10
toroidal grid world, in which each square is
either empty (20%) or contains a resource
(80%). In addition, a grid square may con-
tain a tool that agents are free to pick up
and take away; agents may also drop tools.
Agents occupy one square at a time, and
more than one agent can occupy the same
square. At each time step an agent chooses
one of 12 distinct actions, and performing
an action may lead to positive or nega-
tive payo®s depending on the context. An
agent's choice of action is based on feed-
ing its perceptual state into a reinforcement
learning algorithm and choosing the action
with the highest expected payo® (with a
20% chance of choosing a random action,
in order to encourage exploration). Agents
can perceive their local resource and the
available tools | one on the ground and
one in their grasp | as well as the pres-
ence of other agents (see Figure 1). They
can also perceive the resource type in a
randomly selected square drawn from the
eight-square neighbourhood around their
current location. If they choose to move,
they will travel to this square.
The enviroment is deliberately simple,
even playful: it is certainly not meant to
be realistic. The guiding principles were,
¯rst, not to include an excessive number of
distinct states, as this would make things
di±cult for the agents' reinforcement learn-
ing algorithm, and second, to ensure that￿
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Figure 1: Aspects of the environment that
can be perceived by each agent: the focal
agent is in the left-hand grid square, and
can perceive its local resource type | in
this case a termite nest | the fact that it
is grasping a stick, the presence of another
stick on the ground, the presence of a sec-
ond agent, and the proximity of a tree in
the next grid square. If the agent chose the
travel action, it would move to the tree.
some potential rewards were easily discov-
ered and that others were harder to ¯nd (al-
though possibly made easier with the right
kind of social learning).
Generally, di®erent resources are associ-
ated with distinct payo®s, and require the
right action or sequence of actions to ob-
tain them. The di®erent resource types are
listed below. Actions and tools are shown
in italics, means and standard deviations
for payo®s are shown as ¹ and ¾ respec-
tively, P denotes the prevalence of that re-
source in the environment, and n refers to
the number of times the resource can be
used before it is exhausted. An exhausted
resource reverts to empty, and a replace-
ment appears in a randomly chosen empty
square elsewhere in the environment.
Tree: being in the shade of a tree is pleasant, with
a small constant reward (¹ = 1, ¾ = 0) re-
gardless of the chosen action. P = 10%,
n = 1.
Berries: an easy resource to ¯gure out, berries are
assumed to be automatically eaten (¹ = 10,
¾ = 5) regardless of action. If the agent
shakes the berry bush, twice the payo® is ob-
tained (¹ = 20, ¾ = 5). P = 10%, n = 20.
Nettles: normally cause a nasty sting (¹ = ¡10,
¾ = 5) regardless of action but if an agent
folds the nettle leaves, they can be safely
eaten (¹ = 30, ¾ = 5). P = 10%, n = 20.
Termite nest: the best way to get a meal of ter-
mites is to poke the nest with a peeled stick
(¹ = 100, ¾ = 20) | the termites swarm on
the stick and the agent can lick it clean. Also
a reward for poking with a stick (¹ = 50,
¾ = 10) or without any tool (¹ = 20, ¾ = 5).
Bashing the nest with a stone or a big stone
will get some termites (¹ = 35, ¾ = 10).
P = 10%, n = 10.
Coconuts: need to be bashed to have a chance
of opening them and getting the milk (¹ =
150, ¾ = 20). P = 10%, n = 5. Chance
of successfully opening a coconut depends on
whether stones or big stones are available in
hand and on the ground.
On ground
Nothing Stone Big stone
Holding
None 0.01 0.01 0.01
Stone 0.2 0.6 1.0
Big stone 0.4 0.6 0.8
Monkeys: can be caught and eaten (¹ = 200,
¾ = 20) if an agent chases them, but only if a
second agent is present to block their escape
route. Alternatively an agent can throw a
stone for a 10% chance of success, or throw a
stick, a peeled stick, or a big stone for a 2%
chance of success. P = 10%, n = 2.
Thorns: are painful (¹ = ¡20, ¾ = 5) regardless
of action. P = 10%, n = 1.
Beehive: there is a 20% chance that the bees
will °y out and sting the agent (¹ = ¡200,
¾ = 50) regardless of action. P = 5%, n = 1.
If the agent shakes, pokes, or bashes the hive
the chance of stinging is 100%. The hard-
est trick to learn is getting honey from the
hive (¹ = 500, ¾ = 50, n = 1): the agent
must either bash the nest with a stone or a
big stone for a 50% chance of success (and
a 100% chance of getting stung) or smoke
the bees out by starting a ¯re, i.e., rubbing
two sticks of either type together (one on the
ground and one in the hand).Wasp nest: the same negative properties as the
beehive but with no chance of reward.
P = 5%, n = 1.
An important action not covered above is
scratching, which leads to a modest reward
(¹ = 1, ¾ = 0; ¹ = 2 if the agent is car-
rying either kind of stick) regardless of the
local resource. Scratching provides a kind
of local optimum, in that it is easy for an
agent to get locked into pursuing the mod-
est rewards of this activity, perhaps under
a tree, rather than moving around looking
for more pro¯table resources.
Other actions include peeling, which con-
verts a stick in the agent's hand into a
peeled stick; swapping, which exchanges the
tool on the ground, if any, for the one in
the agent's hand, if any; and travelling,
which moves the agent to the nearby re-
source they have most recently seen. Note
that when an agent attempts an irrelevant
action, such as bashing a tree, the payo® is
always zero.
Tools are distributed generously, with
40 sticks, 20 stones, and 20 large stones
present in the environment. Peeled sticks
only appear if an agent peels a stick. Stones
do not wear out, but sticks and peeled
sticks break after 1000 or 500 time steps re-
spectively; a replacement stick appears at
a random location.
Reinforcement learning agents
The agent population is 25, but initially
agents enter the world one at a time. Every
400 timesteps a new agent is born. When
25 agents are present, the oldest agent is
always killed o® to make room for the
youngest; an agent's lifespan is therefore
10,000 timesteps. The middle-aged agent
born 12 places ahead of a newborn is nom-
inally regarded as its parent, and the new
agent appears in the same square. The sim-
ulation is run for 100,000 time steps, or 10
agent lifetimes. Even though the simula-
tion has \generations" of a sort, there is no
genetic aspect to agent behaviour: each in-
dividual comes into the world as a blank
slate and must learn for itself how to max-
imize payo®s.
Each agent makes its decisions on the
basis of a history of reinforcement: it has
learned to associate some states and ac-
tions with a reward and others with punish-
ment. The di®erent social learning mech-
anisms implemented all assume this un-
derlying capacity for reinforcement learn-
ing. The speci¯c learning algorithm used
was Q-learning (Watkins & Dayan, 1992)
which allows an agent to take into account
not just immediate but also delayed pay-
o®s. This would be important, for example,
in realizing that a higher long-term payo®
could be gained by picking up and peeling
a stick rather than just poking the termite
nest immediately. The learning rate was
0.1, the temporal discounting factor was
0.5, and the proportion of random actions
was 0.2.
Q-learning in its simplest form does not
include any generalization: if an agent
learns that it is good to shake a berry bush
when there is a stone on the ground, it will
not automatically transfer that knowledge
to the case where there is no stone on the
ground. Given 60,000 state-action pairs1
and a lifetime of only 10,000 timesteps it is
clear that an agent could not exhaustively
sample its space of perceived situations.
We therefore included some basic general-
ization: after updating a state-action pair
through Q-learning, all other state-action
pairs that di®ered only in terms of the tools
available, the presence of others, and the re-
source seen in the distance (exception: the
resource being left behind for the travel ac-
110 resources £ 5 tool-on-ground options £ 5
tool-in-hand options £ 2 others-present options £
10 next-resource options £ 12 actions = 60,000.tion) also had their expected returns up-
dated by a small amount in the same di-
rection.
Implementing social learning
To ¯nd baseline levels for payo®s in this en-
vironment, we looked at the performance of
agents with completely random behaviour,
and at that of agents capable only of in-
dividual learning. We then implemented
three of the simple mechanisms described
by Noble and Todd (in press): following
or stimulus enhancement, contagious be-
haviour, and emulation. In addition, we
implemented a version of imitative learn-
ing. Finally, we looked at the perfor-
mance obtained when following was com-
bined with each of the other mechanisms.
Following: (otherwise known as stimulus en-
hancement) is implemented simply by having
each agent occupy the same square as its par-
ent for the ¯rst 25% of its lifetime. Beyond
that, agents learn for themselves.
Contagious behaviour: if another agent is
present, there is a 10% probability that the
¯rst agent will do whatever the second just
did. An instinctive behavioural contagion is
assumed, as when one person's yawning stim-
ulates another to yawn; actions are equally
likely to be copied regardless of their payo®.
Emulation: if another agent is present and ob-
tains a non-zero payo®, the ¯rst agent ad-
justs its estimated return for all state-action
pairs related to its current state. The idea is
that the agent has become aware of an a®or-
dance in the local environment, but has no
idea about what speci¯c action is needed to
exploit it.
Imitation: if another agent is present and obtains
a non-zero payo®, the ¯rst agent is able to
take the perspective of the second. The ¯rst
agent notes the perceptual state of the other,
as well as the action the other chose, and up-
dates its own relevant state-action pair ac-
cordingly. The advance on emulation is that
the ¯rst agent not only knows which action
achieved the reward, but also can perceive
the other agent's state as opposed to its own
(e.g., it might be holding a stick).
Data collection
How can we collect data from this sim-
ulation that parallels the data etholo-
gists would collect when observing a real
species? We assumed that observers
watched the population for the ¯nal 1000
timesteps; i.e., they had a snapshot of the
group's behaviour rather than being able to
observe the rise and fall of socially trans-
mitted behaviours in the long term. We
then looked at the average payo® per agent
during these 1000 timesteps. We can imag-
ine that the ethologists are observing dis-
tinct groups in similar environments and
comparing the average energy intake across
groups. It is natural to assume that a popu-
lation equipped with a richer social learning
ability will be able to extract more energy
from its environment.
We also wanted to measure behavioural
convergence, i.e., the degree to which the
various members of the population tend to
choose the same action when faced with the
same situation. This was done by compil-
ing a list of 1000 states perceived by mem-
bers of the population (the state of a ran-
domly chosen individual was noted at each
timestep). Then all 25 members of the pop-
ulation were faced with each of the 1000
states in turn, and the proportion of indi-
viduals who chose the modal response for
each state was recorded and averaged. We
can imagine that the ethologists have an
outstanding ability to set up naturalistic
experiments in the ¯eld, and are able to
engineer things so that each member of the
population can be placed into the same se-
ries of states and allowed to choose an ac-
tion.
We looked at behavioural convergence
because uniformity of behaviour within a
population, especially when combined with
behavioural variation across populations,
is usually taken as a sign that social learn-
ing is going on. For example, if one group isobserved to hunt monkeys by chasing them
down, while another group tends to throw
stones at them, then it seems to follow that
each animal is not arriving at its own so-
lution to the problem, but rather is being
in°uenced by its fellow group members.
Finally, we looked at simple counts of
the occurrence of various behaviours: the
performance of more complex and hard-to-
learn behaviours would probably be taken
as a sign of sophisticated social learning.
So, for example, if one species has mas-
tered the trick of peeling sticks before pok-
ing them into termite nests, and another
related species has not, one might assume
that the former species has a better social
learning faculty.
Results and discussion
All of the learning mechanisms, both indi-
vidual and social, ensured that the agents
did far better than they would by choosing
a random action. Figure 2 shows that the
mean payo® per agent per timestep was at
least 6 units; the mean payo® for random
behaviour was ¡8:997 units. Behaviours
such as scratching, eating berries, folding
nettle leaves, and poking termite nests (al-
though not often with tools) were all quite
common and allowed the agents to extract
a good return from the environment.
Omitting for a moment the cases in
which following is combined with another
mechanism, we have the surprising result
that the best mean payo® is for emulation,
not imitative learning. Why does this oc-
cur? Emulation means that an agent in-
creases its estimated return for all state-
action pairs associated with any state in
which it witnesses another agent receiving a
positive payo®. E®ectively this means that
emulation encourages exploration around
bene¯cial resources, and results in more in-
quisitive agents who are persistent enough
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
IL Foll. CB Emul. Imit. F/C F/E F/I
M
e
a
n
 
p
a
y
o
f
f
Learning mechanism
Figure 2: Mean payo® per agent per
timestep across the di®erent learning condi-
tions: individual learning, following, conta-
gious behaviour, emulation, imitation, fol-
lowing with contagious behaviour, follow-
ing with emulation, and following with im-
itation. Each data point is averaged across
10 runs, and is shown §1 standard error.
to crack a tricky resource like nettle leaves.
Imitators, on the other hand, are quite con-
servative. Imitative learning is sophisti-
cated enough to allow an agent to pick up
any clever trick it might witness, but imita-
tors appear to be caught in a vicious circle
in which the only role models they observe
are other conservative imitators (see the be-
havioural pro¯les in Figure 4).
Figure 2 also shows that the simple mat-
ter of following your parent around for the
¯rst quarter of your life is enough to in-
crease your mean payo® signi¯cantly. This
is more impressive than it seems, as the im-
position of following behaviour threatens to
decrease payo®s by increasing feeding com-
petition: a resource will run out twice as
fast if it is being consumed by both par-
ent and child. Contagious behaviour, on
the other hand, did not do any better than
individual learning. It may be that occa-
sional instinctive copying is unhelpful be-
cause agents already try random actions
20% of the time and will thus reach thesame result in the end.
When following behaviour is combined
with other mechanisms, the story becomes
more complex. It is obviously not the case
that following and the other three mech-
anisms mesh together in a simple additive
fashion: the e±ciency of imitation and con-
tagious behaviour is increased, but the ef-
¯ciency of emulation is decreased. Clearly
it is important to imitate or emulate the
right people: an experienced parent in one
case, and a random cross-section of society
in the other.
Behavioural convergence (Figure 3) was
0:55 even in the individual learning case.
The convergence score for random be-
haviour was inevitably much lower at 0.18,
and thus we are reminded that similar be-
haviour may be brought about by similar
learning experiences rather than any form
of social learning. Convergence was high-
est in the two imitation conditions, which
makes sense. However, the low conver-
gence for emulation belies the fact that
these agents were doing well in terms of
mean payo®, and convergence rates are the
same across the two imitation conditions,
despite the fact that it is only in the fol-
lowing / imitation condition that high pay-
o®s are achieved. An observation of high or
low behavioural convergence, which might
lead one to suspect the presence or absence
of e®ective social learning, is meaningless
considered alone.
Figure 4 shows frequency counts for sev-
eral behaviours across the di®erent con-
ditions. It shows that di®erent learn-
ing mechanisms lead to quite di®erent be-
havioural pro¯les, e.g., emulators spend a
lot of time folding nettle leaves, whereas
imitators have mastered the art of shak-
ing berry bushes. It is not simply the case
that the more \advanced" the social learn-
ing mechanism, the more behaviours are
added to the repertoire.
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Figure 3: Behavioural convergence across
the di®erent learning conditions. Each data
point is averaged across 10 runs, and is
shown §1 standard error.
Another surprising ¯nding is that some
behaviours that would seem to suit imi-
tative learning, such as learning to peel a
stick and then poke it into a termite nest,
are in fact more often performed by agents
with simpler mechanisms (Figure 4, bot-
tom). Agents who follow their parents are
the ones who do this most often. Even so,
it seems that this behaviour was largely too
hard: note the low frequency counts over-
all. Imitators could certainly have picked
up this trick, but again it seems they did
not have access to the right role models.
Conclusions
We hope to have demonstrated that imita-
tive learning is not always going to be the
best strategy for a group-living animal, and
that the e®ectiveness of any social learning
strategy will depend on details of the en-
vironment and additional facts about the
animal's lifestyle. We readily admit that
the impressive performance of emulation in
our model, for example, is not likely to be
a general result, but is tied to the particu-
lars of the simulated environment and the0
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Figure 4: Frequencies with which various
behaviours were observed across the dif-
ferent learning conditions: from top to
bottom, scratching, shaking berry bushes,
folding nettle leaves, and poking termite
nests with peeled sticks. Each data point is
averaged across 10 runs, and is shown §1
standard error.
underlying reinforcement learning system.
But that is exactly the point.
The argument which inspired this paper
(Noble and Todd, in press) had two as-
pects: ¯rst, simpler social learning mecha-
nisms are inherently more likely to evolve;
one reason for this is that complex mecha-
nisms such as imitation will involve signif-
icant costs. It follows that we should look
for simple mechanisms in nature. Second,
in cases of doubt about which mechanism
is at work, from an epistemological point of
view it is good practice to start by propos-
ing simpler mechanisms. The current sim-
ulation results show that an even stronger
argument is possible: even if imitation was
available via a cost-free, one-step mutation,
it sill might not be the best learning mech-
anism for a given species.
A focus on imitation as the only kind of
social learning worth having is misplaced.
Researchers interested in imitation as a po-
tential tool for instructing robots or soft-
ware agents, for example, might do well to
consider giving their creations more spar-
tan mechanisms, which have the additional
bene¯t of being far easier to program. If
the agent is equipped with a reinforcement
learning system, it would be a good start
to simply have it follow a more experienced
agent (e.g., a person).
We believe our model also shows that
ethologists comparing how well two di®er-
ent groups of animals get on in similar en-
vironments, or looking at data on \tradi-
tions" or \proto-cultural behaviour" (i.e.,
behavioural convergence) may ¯nd that
data to be quite misleading as to the under-
lying social learning mechanisms at work.
It is not the case, for example, that low
behavioural convergence necessarily means
an absence of social learning. One has to
be careful in looking at exactly how be-
haviours are transmitted from one individ-
ual to another. Theories about the adap-tive value of social learning, such as Laland
et al. (1996), are useful, but ideally we want
to move beyond such theories and look at
hypotheses about the utility of a particular
mechanism in a particular environment.
We deliberately omitted an evolutionary
dimension from the current model as we
wanted to look at the e®ects of learning
alone. However, future work could incor-
porate an evolutionary aspect, in which
di®erent social learning mechanisms were
selected for over generational time. The
mean payo® results certainly suggest that
this would not be a straightforward story
of hill-climbing with imitation at the peak.
Let us assume that a single-step mutation
F controls following behaviour, and a two-
step mutation leads from individual learn-
ing to emulation (S1) and thence to imi-
tative learning (S2). This latter assump-
tion is reasonable as imitative learning can
be seen as a \sharpened" version of emu-
lation. For an evolving population of in-
dividual learners, the ¯nal strategy will be
emulation if S1 occurs ¯rst, as F and S2
will both be associated with a loss in ¯t-
ness. On the other hand, if F occurs ¯rst,
both S1 and then S2 will mean increases in
¯tness, and the population will end up as
follower / imitators.
It would be useful to move away from
our simplistic lookup-table implementation
of Q-learning and use a neural network as
a more natural way of generalizing across
perceptual states. We are also interested in
investigating whether in¯nite negative pay-
o®s, i.e., actions that result in the death
of the agent, push an evolving popula-
tion towards imitative strategies. Finally,
we would like to use the same basic tech-
nique described here to produce a high-
¯delity model of social learning in a partic-
ular species, e.g., chimpanzees, and thereby
comment on which mechanisms are plau-
sibly being used by that species, much as
Noble et al. (2001) do for Norway rats.
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